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Introduction
The global games framework, first proposed in Carlsson and Van Damme [2] (henceforth "CVD") for two-player two-action games, has been widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities 1 . A global game extends a complete information game g by a payoff function u that depends on an additional state parameter t. In this approach, each agent receives a noisy private signal about the true state. Hence, at equilibrium, he's uncertain not only about his own payoff function but also -and more importantly-about other agents' beliefs and behavior. CVD's first result is that the set of rationalizable strategies shrinks to a unique equilibrium as the noise in private signals vanishes. They also established, as a second result, that the selected equilibrium is to play the risk-dominant strategy (Harsanyi and Selten [4] ). Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [3] (henceforth "FMP") extended CVD's approach to manyplayer many-action games with strategic complementarities by showing that as the amplitude of the noise goes to zero, the limit uniqueness result of CVD holds: agents coordinate on some action profile that is a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game g. Nevertheless, in contrast with CVD, they restrict their analysis to settings where the state parameters belong to the real line and assume that actions are linearly ordered so that higher states lead to higher actions. Such an assumption is restrictive since agents involved in such complex coordination problems as speculative attacks often have to examine not only one but several criteria. In addition, the one-dimensional setting implies in particular that if the switch from one state to another gives to one agent an incentive to play a higher action, then it must also be the case for all the other agents. Yet, in most economic applications, it is not possible to exclude that different agents may focus on different criteria. In other terms, restricting to one-dimensional settings may imply too much homogeneity among the agents.
Regarding the second result of CVD, FMP provide a counter-example which shows that, unfortunately, in many-player many-action games, the selected action profile may depend on the fine details of the noise distribution. They thus define the notion of noise-independent selection: an action profile is said to be noise-independently selected at some state parameter if it is played at this state parameter regardless of the noise structure. Not being noiseindependent is a weakness for a given selection since the global games approach considers situations where the noise shrinks to zero : in general, there is no specific rationale for 1 For a survey of the applied literature, see Morris and Shin [6] and Morris [5] .
choosing a noise structure rather than another. In a recent contribution, Basteck, Daniels and Heinemann [1] provide several positive results on the notion of noise-independent selection. First, they show that it is an intrinsic property of a complete information game : if a game of strategic complementarities is noise-independent under one (one-dimensional) global game embedding then it is also noise-independent under every other (one-dimensional) global game embedding. Second, they give simple sufficient conditions for noise-independent selection. In particular, they show that if an equilibrium is "robust to incomplete information", as defined by Kajii and Morris [5] , then it will be noise-independently selected 2 . They also establish that the global game selection in a complete information game g may be noise-independent if g can be suitably decomposed into smaller noise-independent games. This result gives a simple tool to extend binary action environments to many-action games.
The present paper considers a setting generalizing both the framework of CVD and that of FMP: the complete information game g has an arbitrary number of players and actions and the state parameter t is multidimensional. In addition, in contrast with FMP, it is not assumed that for each state parameter t in the support of the prior distribution, the complete information game associated with t is supermodular. Our main result shows the coherence and robustness of the notion of noise-independent selection: if the action profile a is noiseindependently selected in one-dimensional global games, then it is also noise-independently selected in all multidimensional global games.
Setting and Definitions
In this paper, we consider games with a finite set of players I, who have finite and linearly ordered action sets A i∈I . We write C for the cardinal of the set ∪ i∈I A i . We define the joint action space A as Π i∈I A i and write A −i for Π j =i A j . We say that a = (a i ) i∈I ∈ A is weakly greater than a = (a i ) i∈I ∈ A if a i ≥ a i for all i ∈ I and write a ≥ a .
2 In 2 × 2 games, the risk-dominant equilibrium is robust. Characterizations for more general games have been given by Morris and Ui [8] and Oyama and Tercieux [9] . A heuristic argument establishing that robustness implies noise-independence may be found in Morris and Shin [7] . Oyama and Takahashi [10] showed recently that noise-independent selection (for one-dimensional global games) does not imply robustness.
N -dimensional Global Games
Fix N ≥ 1. For all x ∈ R N , we write ||x|| for the euclidean norm of x and for each µ > 0, we write B µ (x) for the closed ball of radius µ around x. A global game G ν (u, φ, ψ) is an incomplete information game where payoffs depend on a random variable t ∈ R N , called the state parameter, which is distributed according to a continuous density ψ, called the prior distribution. The individual payoffs are given by u i (a i , a −i , t), where a i denotes i's action and a −i denotes the opposing action profile. They are assumed to be continuous in the state parameter t. φ is a tuple of atomless densities that we refer to as the noise structure. Each player i ∈ I observes a N -dimensional private signal x i = t + νη i about t, where ν > is a scale factor and η i an error that is distributed according to the density φ i whose support is a subset of B signals (x i ) i∈I , then s(x) denotes the action profile (s i (x i )) i∈I . Slightly abusing notation, for
x ∈ R, we also denote the action profile given by (s i (x)) i∈I by s(x). We say that the strategy profile s is weakly greater than the strategy profile s if s(x) ≥ s (x) for all x ∈ R and write s ≥ s .
As in FMP, our main solution concept is iterative strict dominance. First we eliminate pure strategies that are strictly dominated, as rational players will never pick (i.e., put positive weight on) such strategies. Then we eliminate a player's pure strategies that are strictly dominated if her opponents are known to mix only over the pure strategies that survived the prior round of elimination; and so on.
Embedding a Complete Information Game in a Global Game
Let a complete information game g be specified by its payoff function g i∈I (a i , a −i ) with g i :
A → R for each player i. For each i ∈ I, a i , a i ∈ A i and a −i ∈ A −i , we note ∆g i (a i → a i , a −i ) for the difference in payoff of player i from playing a i versus a i when the action profile of his opponents is a −i , that is,
A game g is a game of strategic complementarities if greater opposing action profiles make greater action more appealing, or more precisely, if for all i, a i ≥ a i and a −i ≥ a −i ,
We say that the global game G ν (u, φ, ψ) embeds the complete information game g at state parameter t if there existt ∈ [0, 1] and a continuous function θ : [0, 1] → R N such that (i) θ(t ) = t and (ii) the four assumptions below are satisfied.
By a slight abuse of notation, for each µ > 0, we write B µ (Θ) for the set of y ∈ R N such that there existst ∈ [0, 1] with: ||y − θ(t)|| ≤ µ. Assumption 1. There existsμ > 0 such that for all state parameters t ∈ Bμ(Θ), ψ(t) > 0.
Assumption 2. For all t ∈ Bμ(Θ), the complete information game associated with the payoff function u(·, t) is a game of strategic complementarities.
For each player i, write u θ i :
Assumption 3. The payoff function u θ satisfies strict monotonicity. That is, there is a 
Noise-Independent Selection in One-dimensional Global Games
In this subsection, we assume that N = 1. In this specific case, it is easily checked that the framework presented in Subsection 2.2 is equivalent to the one proposed by FMP and their main result applies: Theorem 1 (FMP, Theorem 1). The global game G ν (u, φ, ψ) has an essentially unique strategy profile surviving iterative strict dominance in the limit as ν → 0. More precisely, there exists an increasing pure strategy profile s such that if, for each ν > 0, s ν is a pure strategy profile that survives iterative strict dominance in G ν (u, φ, ψ), then for each player i,
for all x i , except possibly at the finitely many discontinuities of s i .
We also recall the definition that FMP introduced for noise-independent selection. Definition 1. We say that the action profile a is noise-independently selected at some state parameter t if s (t ) = a , regardless of the noise structure φ. FMP established that s does not depend on the prior distribution ψ. In addition, Basteck, Daniels and Heinemann [1] showed that the global game selection is independent of the payoff function u of the global game embedding. Consequently, noise-independence (for onedimensional global games) is an intrinsic property of a complete information game.
Main Result
When N > 1, the argument of FMP for limit uniqueness does not hold and we cannot use the strategy profile s for the definition of noise-independence. Hence, we adopt instead the following equivalent formulation. Definition 2. We say that the action profile a is noise-independently selected in N-dimensional global games embedding the complete information game g if for each N-dimensional global game G ν (u, φ, ψ) embedding g at a state parameter t , there existsν > 0 such that for each ν <ν and each strategy profile s ν surviving iterative strict dominance in G ν (u, φ, ψ),
We now state our main result.
Theorem 2.
If the action profile a is noise-independently selected in 1-dimensional global games embedding the complete information game g, then a is also noise-independently selected in N-dimensional global games embedding g for all N > 1.
Proof
Fix N > 1, a N -dimensional global game G ν (u, φ, ψ) and a parameter function θ : [0, 1] → R N . We note E ν (∆u i (a i → a i )|x i , s −i ) for the expected difference in utility of player i from playing a i versus a i against the strategy profile s −i when he receives the signal x i in G ν (u, φ, ψ). We will also use the notation P ν (F |x i ) (resp. P ν (F |t)) to refer to the probability of an event F conditional on the signal x i (resp. the state parameter t).
Let us write V for the set of unit vectors v ∈ R N . For any v ∈ V and d ∈ R, we set:
where the symbol · denotes the dot product in R N . Moreover, for each player i, we let the
is the density of probability associated with the event η i ∈ L(v, d). We note Φ v i for the distribution function associated with φ v i . For each unit vector v ∈ R N , we write G θ (ν, v) for the one-dimensional global game associated with the noise structure (φ v i ) i∈I , the payoff function (u θ i ) i∈I , the scale factor ν and where the payoff parameter t is drawn uniformly from the interval [0, 1]. In addition, applying FMP's main result, we note s θ (v) for the essentially unique strategy profile surviving iterative strict dominance in G θ (ν, v) as the noise shrinks to zero. Notice that if action profile a is noise-independently selected in one dimensional global games at state parametert , then for each unit vector v, s θ (v) takes the value a att . Consequently, Theorem 2 directly follows from Theorem 3 below.
Theorem 3. Lett ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ A be such that for all unit vectors v, s θ (v) takes the value a att . Then, there exists ν > 0 such that for each ν < ν , each pure strategy profile
Proof. We will establish that there exists ν > 0 such that for each ν < ν , each strategy profile s ν surviving iterative strict dominance in G ν (u, φ, ψ) must satisfy s ν (θ(t )) ≤ a . (A symmetric argument yields that s ν (θ(t )) ≥ a .) As in FMP, we introduce the notion of a simplified global game G θ (ν, v) that differs from G θ (ν, v) in that each player i's payoff depends directly on her signal x i rather than on the statet. Following notations similar to those used for the multidimensional global game G ν (u, φ, ψ), we let E v ν (∆u θ i (a i → a i )|x i , s −i ) denote the expected difference in utility of player i from playing a i versus a i against the strategy profile s −i when he receives the signal x i in G θ (ν, v). We also write P v ν (E|x i ) (resp. P v ν (E|t)) for the probability of an event E conditional on the signal x i (resp. the state parametert) in G θ (ν, v). For each ν > 0, we know (FMP, Lemma 4) that there exists an essentially unique strategy profile surviving iterative strict dominance in G θ (ν, v) and we write s θ (ν, v) = {s θ i (ν, v)} i∈I for its right-continuous version. For each i, we define:
In addition, for each increasing strategy profile s in a one-dimensional global game, we set:
for each a i ∈ ∪ i∈I A i and x(a −i , s) = (x(a j , s)) j =i . The fact that the simplified global game
as the noise vanishes allows to establish Proposition 1 below. (The proof is standard but provided in Appendix for the sake of completeness.) Proposition 1. There existν and λ > 0 such that for each i ∈ I,ν <ν and unit vector
Proof. See Appendix.
We now pick someν < min(ν , λ , L). (In the sequel of the proof, the scale factorν will sometimes be omitted from notations). We first build a "compressed" version of s θ (ν, v) for each unit vector v. Lemma 1. For each ν <ν and each v ∈ V , there exists a strategy profile
where we recall that C denotes the cardinal of the set ∪ i∈I A i ) and,
Proof. Since s θ (ν, v) is increasing and the joint action space A is finite, we can identify s θ (ν, v) with a finite sequence z 1 (v), z 2 (v), . . . , z k (v) with k ≤ C of jump points, at which players switch to greater action profiles. Now, for each ν > 0, define recursively the sequence , v) be the right-continuous increasing strategy profile such that:
We prove that s θ c (ν, ν, v) satisfies the required properties. Fix some a i ∈ ∪ i∈I A + i . Point 1 is easily checked. Regarding Point 2, notice that since ν andν are smaller than min(λ ,ν ),
On the other hand, sinceν < L, we must have by the definition of dominance regions,
for all a i = max A i , which by construction implies: x(a i , s θ c (ν, ν, v)) ∈ [ν, 1 − ν]. Hence, Remark 1 below, which directly follows from the fact that the prior is uniformly distributed on [0,1] in the one-dimensional global game G θ (ν, v) allows to conclude the proof.
Proof. It suffices to notice that since x i ∈ [ν, 1 − ν] and the prior is uniformly distributed on [0,1], applying Bayes' rule:
yields the desired result.
For all λ ∈ [−1, 1] and ν > 0, define the strategy profile s(λ,ν, ν) in the N -dimensional global game G ν (u, φ, ψ) as follows for each player i and signal x i ∈ R N :
We consider, for each ν > 0, the following sequence of strategy profiles {s(ν) (ν),ν, ν) , where the sequence {λ n (ν)} n∈N is defined recursively by :
where max BR i denotes the maximal best-response strategy of player i tos −i (ν) n .
Lemma 2. There exists ν > 0 such that for each ν < ν , the sequence {s(ν) n } n∈N is decreasing and each strategy profile s ν surviving iterative strict dominance in the game G ν (u, φ, ψ)
satisfies: s ν ≤s(ν) n , for all n ∈ N.
Proof of Lemma 2. There exists ν such that for each ν < ν :
(whereμ is as defined in Assumption 1.) Note that Equation (1) means that for each player i
and signal x i / ∈ Bμ − ν 2 (Θ), we must haves n i (x i ) = max A i , for all n. Now fix some ν < ν . We prove Lemma 2 by induction. It is trivially true at rank 0. Assume that it is also true at rank n, that is, assume thats(ν) n+1 ≤s(ν) n and that each strategy profile s ν surviving iterative strict dominance satisfies: s ν ≤s(ν) n . For each player i and signal x i ∈ R N , we need to distinguish two cases. If the payoff function associated with t is supermodular. Consequently, on the one hand, by the second induction hypothesis, we deduce that each strategy s ν,i surviving iterative strict dominance must satisfy:
On the other hand, by the first induction hypothesis, we have:
which implies that λ n+2 (ν) ≥ λ n+1 (ν) ands(ν) n+2 ≤s(ν) n+1 .
The sequence {λ n (ν)} n∈N is increasing and bounded. Hence, the sequences {λ n } n∈N and {s(ν) n } n∈N converge and we note respectivelyλ ands(ν) for their limits. By Lemma 2, for each ν, each strategy profile s ν surviving iterative strict dominance in the game G ν (u, φ, ψ) satisfies: s ν ≤s(ν). Hence, to conclude the proof of Theorem 3, it suffices to establish that there exists ν > 0 such that for each ν < ν ,λ(ν) ≥ 0. (Indeed, since x(a i , s θ c (ν, ν,ṽ)) −t ≥ 0, the above condition implies thats(ν)(x i ) = a i for all x i ∈ R N with ||t − x i || ≤ √ ν.)
Proposition 2 below is the main step of the proof.
Proposition 2. For any given δ > 0, there exists ν(δ) such that the following property is satisfied for all λ ∈ [−1, 1] and ν < ν(δ). For each player i, action a i ∈ A + i \ max A i and signal x i ∈ R N with s i (λ,ν, ν)(x i ) ≤ a i , there exists a unit vectorṽ ∈ V such that:
for all a −i ∈ A −i .
The proof of Proposition 3 below comes from the strict monotonicity of the payoff function (u θ i ) i∈I .
Proposition 3.
There exists ν > 0 such that the following property is satisfied for all λ ≤ 0 and ν < ν . For each player i, action a i ∈ A + i \max A i , unit vector v ∈ V and signal x i ∈ R N with s(λ,ν, ν)(x i ) ≤ a i :
We are now in a position to conclude the proof of Theorem 3. Since s θ (ν,ṽ) is an equilibrium profile of the one-dimensional (simplified) global game G θ (ν,ṽ),
for all a i ∈ A i . Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we know by strategic complementarities that there exists ν > 0 such that the following property holds for all λ < 0 and ν < ν . For each player i, action a i ∈ A + i \ max A i and x i ∈ R N with s i (λ,ν, ν)(x i ) ≤ a i , there exists a unit vectorṽ ∈ V such that:
for all a i ∈ A + i with a i > a i . Now, fix some λ < 0 and ν < ν such that √ ν + Cν ≤μ. For each player i, action (3) and (4) together imply:
for all a i ∈ A + i with a i > a i . Notice on the one hand that there exists a function f (λ, ν) :
On the other hand, since the function
is continuous and the set of x i ∈ R N such that s(λ,ν, ν)(x i ) ≤ a i for some a i < max A i is included in the compact set Bμ(Θ), there exists ε > 0 such that :
for all x i , x i ∈ R N with s(λ,ν, ν)(x i ) ≤ a i for some a i < max A i and ||x i − x i || < ε. The two above arguments together yield that, by Equation (5), there must exist some τ (λ, ν) > 0 such that for each i, a i ∈ A
for all a i ∈ A i with a i > a i . Consequently, max BR(s(λ,ν, ν)) ≤ s(λ + τ (λ, ν),ν, ν), which implies that λ cannot be equal toλ(ν). This establishes thatλ(ν) must be positive and thus concludes the proof.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that, given a real non-negative parameter ε, a strategy profile is said to be an ε-equilibrium if it is not possible for any player to gain more than ε in expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from his strategy. For all increasing and right-continuous strategy profiles s and s in a one-dimensional global game G θ (ν, v), we define:
In addition, for each i and a i ∈ A i \ max A i , we set:
and,
Lemma 3. For each unit vector v ∈ V , ν > 0, ε ≥ 0 and ε-equilibria in increasing strategies
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume, w.l.o.g., that there exists a player i and an actionâ i ∈ A i such that ∆(s, s ) = x(â i , s ) − x(â i , s) > 0. Let s = {s i } i∈I be defined for each player i by:
Hence, Equations (6) and (7) together yield: ∆(s, s ) ≤ 2ε K , concluding the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. For any ε > 0, there exists ν > 0 such that for each unit vector v ∈ V and ν, ν > 0 with ν < ν < ν , there exists an increasing profile s v ν→ν such that 1) ∆(s v ν→ν , s θ (ν , v)) < ε and 2) ∆(s v ν→ν , s θ (ν, v)) < ε.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix some ε > 0. We first need to introduce some additional notations. For each ν > 0 and unit vector v, we define the equivalence relation ∼ v ν as follows. For each a i , a j ∈ ∪ i∈I A i , a i ∼ v ν a j if and only if there exists a sequence of actions {a r } r=1,...,R ∈ ∪ i∈I A i such that: a 1 = a i , a R = a j , and, for all r = 1, . . . , R − 1,
We also define the order on the quotient space
ν . It can easily be checked that define a total order on the quotient space. Now, for
Finally, let the increasing strategy profile s v ν→ν be such that for each player i and action
Now, fix some ν < L. Remark 2 below follows from the construction of s v ν→ν and the fact that the prior is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] in G θ (ν, v).
Remark 2. For each player i and each action
for all action profiles a −i ∈ A −i .
Proof. Since s θ (ν, v) is an equilibrium profile in the simplified game G θ (ν , v), the existence of dominance regions yields:
And, symmetrically,
In addition, for each a i , a j ∈ ∪ i∈I A i with a i ∼ v ν a j ,
Hence, Remark 1 allows to conclude the proof.
We now prove that the strategy profile s v ν→ν satisfies the required properties. Notice that for all actions a i , a j ∈ ∪ i∈I A i with [
where we recall that C denotes the cardinal of the set ∪ i∈I A i ). Consequently, for each
for each player i and each action a i ∈ A i , which establishes Point 2 of Lemma 4. Let us turn to Point 1. We show that for each ε > 0, there exists ν > 0 such that s v ν→ν is an ε-equilibrium of G θ (ν , v) for all ν < ν. Lemma 3 then allows to conclude the proof. In order to do so, by a standard argument, using strategic complementarities and the monotonicity of u θ , it suffices to establish that the following properties are satisfied for each i and
for all actions a i ∈ A i . On the other hand, recall that for each player i and each action profile a ∈ A, the function u θ i (a,t) is continuous int. Consequently, since the interval [0, 1] is compact, there must exist a function ξ θ : R + → R + such that for all i, a ∈ A, ε > 0 and
C . By Equation (9) above, we must have:
for all a ∈ A. And,
for all a −i ∈ A −i and a i , a i ∈ A i . Consequently, Remark 2 above allows to conclude the proof.
We now conclude the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
We first introduce some additional notations. For any signal x i ∈ R N , unit vector v ∈ V and
Similarly, for any
For each a i ∈ ∪ i∈I A + i and unit vector v, notice that 1 ν (x(a i , s θ c (ν,ν, v)) −t ) does not depend on ν and set:
By a slight abuse of notation, we write κ(a −i ,ν, v) for the vector (κ(a j ,ν, v)) j =i and κ(a
Lemma 5. For any δ > 0, there exists ν 1 (δ) > 0 such that for all ν < ν 1 (δ), λ ∈ [−1, 1],
for all unit vectors v ∈ V and a −i ∈ A
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix some δ > 0. For each
The set Bμ(Θ) is compact and the prior density ψ is continuous and strictly positive on Bμ(Θ). Hence, there exists ν(δ) > 0 such that for each ν < ν(δ) and
On the one hand, applying Bayes' rule, 
On the other hand, note that:
Consequently, we have:
This yields, applying Equation (12) and the fact that ν < ν(δ),
It now suffices to recall that by construction of s θ c (ν, ν, v) (Lemma 1):
and that, by Remark 1,
to conclude the proof.
Lemma 6. For any ε > 0, there exists ν 2 (ε) > 0 such that, for each ν < ν 2 (ε), the following property holds for each
There exists a unit vectorṽ ∈ V such that for each j = i, a j ∈ A + j and x j ∈ R N satisfying:
we have:
Proof of Lemma 6. We first establish Claim 1 below.
Claim 1. For any ε > 0, there exists ν 3 (ε) > 0 such that the following property holds for
. For all κ ∈ [0, C] and x j ∈ R N such that:
, we have:
Proof of Claim 1. We begin with the following remark.
. For all ν > 0 and d ∈ R, the following two properties are satisfied.
2. If d ≥ −1, we have:
Proof of Remark 3. Fix some
For all x j ∈ B ν (x i ), ||x j − x i || 2 ≤ ν 2 . Hence, using Equation (13), we deduce that
for all x j ∈ L ν (x i Notice that by the definition ofṽ, ||θ(t) − (x i + (dν)ṽ)|| = ||θ(t) − x i || + dν.
Thus, ||θ(t) − x j || 2 = (||θ(t) − x i || + dν) 2 + ||x j − (x i + (dν)ṽ)|| 2 .
Consequently, by Equation (14),
which concludes the proof.
We now conclude the proof of Claim 1. . We distinguish two cases. First assume that κ − κ − ε < −1. By Remark 3, we know that:
Now assume that κ − κ − ε ≥ −1. In that case, by Remark 3, ||θ(t) − x j || 2 ≤ (||θ(t) − x i || + (κ − κ − ε)ν) 2 + ν 2 , for each x j ∈ H ν (x i ,ṽ, κ − κ − ε) ∩ B ν (x i ). Since ||θ(t) − x i || ≥ √ ν 2 , we have: ||θ(t) − x i || + (κ − κ − ε)ν > 0 when ν is sufficiently small (i.e., such that √ ν 2 > ν), which means that (||θ(t) − x i || + (κ − κ − ε)ν) 2 increases with ||θ(t) − x i ||. This yields, using the fact that ||θ(t) − x i || ≤ √ ν + κν,
In addition, we have:
Consequently,
that is,
Note that:
We deduce that when ν is sufficiently small (compared to ε):
This finally yields, using Equation (15),
which concludes the proof of Claim 1. 
